The key question is how long is too long? The legislature has not set a deadline for when associations must seek to enforce covenant violations other than general statutes of limitations See §95.11 Fla. Stat. (1997). Until recently the only guideline for when an association may enforce a covenant was the decision in Plaza del Prado Cd'm. Ass'n., Inc. v. Richman, 345 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977). In the Richman decision Florida's Third District Court of Appeal held that it was not proper for an association to delay enforcing a covenant for twelve months.

The Richman decision did not answer the ultimate question. The decision only held that twelve months was too long. The Court did not state the maximum amount of time an assocation can delay enforcement. Caution was urged because generally courts disfavor covenant enforcement litigation. Courts do not want to enter injunctions which require the court to monitor whether an order is being enforced. Thus, when an association requests that a covenant be enforced generally the court will look to see if the violation is so important to justify an injunction.

Recently the Fourth District Court of Appeals located in Palm Beach County addressed this issue in Mora v. Karr, _____ So. 2d _____, 22 Fla. Law Weekly D1522 (Fla. 4th DCA, June 25, 1997). Mr. Mora agreed to waive his right to enforce two use restrictions which could have prevented the Karrs from tearing down their home and building a larger residence. Despite the waiver agreement and after the Karrs demolished the home and started construction, Mora filed suit seeking to enforce the covenants and stop the work. Apparently faced with the contradiction that he waived the covenants, another neighbor, the Moores, joined the lawsuit. The Moores were represented by Mr. Mora's attorney; however, they apparently were not obligated to pay fees to the attorney.

The trial court denied Mr. Mora and the Moores' request for a temporary injunction to enforce the covenants. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant a temporary injunction. Concerning the Moores, the appellate court held that:

The fact that they delayed seeking relief until eight or nine months after construction commenced would warrant denial of injunctive relief for a violation of restrictive covenants.

(Emphasis added, citations omitted). Thus, the Moore's delay in seeking relief was fatal to the Moores enforcing the covenants.

If the Mora decision is followed, then the time for filing suit to enforce a covenant is drastically reduced. Again, the Mora court did not specify the absolute deadline for bringing a claim; however, the manner in which the Moore claim was disposed reflects that an eight month delay may be fatal to a case.

In Rabon a security guard working for a security company which was acting as a independent contractor at a motel was injured. The injured security guard was paid workers' compensation benefits by the security company. The security guard filed a lawsuit against the motel, and the motel defended claiming it was immune under the workers' compensation statutes.

The appellate court stated that to be included within the definition of "statutory employer" under the workers' compensation laws and therefore immune from a civil lawsuit, a party must show that it was engaged in performing "contract work" and that it sublet a part of the contract work to another party. The appellate court concluded that the motel's duty to maintain safe premises did not arise from a contract; rather, the obligation was imposed by common law. Thus, the motel was not immune from civil liability and could be sued by the contractor's employee.

Associations often hire third parties to perform certain work. In such situations associations are "contractors". If an association undertakes work as part of a contractual obligation to its members and the association sublets a part of the work to another party, then the association may be protected by the workers' compensation laws from a civil lawsuit. In what instances association's obligation to its members arises out of a contract with its members is still unclear. If the duty is imposed by a declaration of covenants or condominium, then the declaration may be deemed a contract and the association deemed a "statutory employer".